Based on enhance the corporate governance - Exploration of Directors’ and Officers’(D&O) Liability Insurance Development in Taiwan

Kuo Hao Lin, Ting Hua Hsu


  The Taiwan government top-down administration to promote the corporate governance, TSFB has been trying its best to emphasize the significance of corporate governance for public companies, thus, TSFB announced the “Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for Listed Companies” in 2002, one of the major part in the project is to enhance board functions, which is also the same goals in chapter 6 of OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. In order to achieve the goal of improving the effectiveness of the board of directors, one statute based on TFSC’s corporate governance Roadmap (2019~2020) requires listed companies to insure D&O liability insurance (Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance). As a result, this paper intended to discuss the legal liability of board directors and supervisors through a review of D&O liability insurance literature. With an evaluation of D&O liability insurance, this research can have some contribution to enhance the corporate governance.

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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.