Determinants of Credit Union Deposits and Another Role During Times of An Economic Crisis: A Retrospective View

Andreas Rauterkus, Zo Ramamonjiavelo, George Munchus

Abstract


This study examines the impact of credit union risk characteristics and macroeconomic events on deposits.  Looking at a sample of credit unions from 2004-2008 we find that credit union depositors do not consistently punish credit union for risky behavior by deposit withdrawal, which could be explained by the existence of deposit insurance and the role of credit union depositors as shareholders.  Furthermore, we find that credit union deposits increase in times of economic uncertainty.  This indicates that there is a group of people that consider credit unions a safe haven during an economic crisis. If credit unions are considered safe in times of economic crises their role among financial institutions receives a whole new dimension.


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References


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Copyright (c) 2018 Andreas Rauterkus, Zo Ramamonjiavelo, George Munchus

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.