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ABSTRACT
This review seeks to investigate the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance of mutual funds under the intervention of fund flows and moderation of compensation incentives. Actively managed mutual funds continue to co-exist side by side with index funds despite cost differentials between them. A fundamental question has been whether these actively managed funds add value to their investors by producing superior returns commensurate with added managerial input or not. In a bid to post positive alphas and improve their compensation incentives, fund managers rely on past returns, intuition and gut feeling to build their confidence levels as they make their daily portfolio balancing acts. Overconfident fund managers who post positive alphas receive increased fund inflows leading to better compensation incentives and more visible fund families.

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1. Introduction

Actively managed mutual funds continue to co-exist side by side with index funds despite cost differentials between them. A fundamental question has been whether these actively managed funds add value to their investors by producing superior returns commensurate with added managerial input. Such abnormal returns could be attributable to managerial skill, luck or access to private material information. Perceived abnormal returns before costs have been a key feature of mutual fund evaluation conundrum. Fundamental questions persist in mutual fund research: could superior outperformance of actively managed mutual funds be measured statistically?, and what are the appropriate variables to use, whether the outperformance of mutual funds could be identified ex-ante or only ex-post, and does this outperformance persist in to the future? Do outperformance returns from active mutual funds accrue to investors or do they end up being absorbed by fund managers through management fees and other costs? Could such returns be attributable to fund manager skill, luck or environmental connotations?

**Fund Manager Overconfidence**

As financial agents, professional investors often operate in an environment that is significantly different from the assumptions of conventional finance which views financial agents in terms of “rational” actors in the marketplace. It is assumed that these actors use formal methods to identify mispriced assets in an efficient market. In contrast, the world of the real investment manager is one where she is overloaded with information asymmetry, relies on gut feeling for subjective judgment with the prospect of job loss upon unsatisfactory returns. These environmental factors could affect their confidence levels and thus impair decision making processes and ultimately investment performance.

Psychology literature explains overconfidence along two lines; motivationally, individuals hold unrealistically positive self-perceptions to boost their happiness in a utilitarian way. Cognitively, individuals expect to succeed and accept responsibility for expected outcomes, leading to self-serving attribution bias. Three proxies are used in this paper to measure overconfidence: over-optimism, excessive certainty and excessive self-reference. *Diction* software will be used to extract the first two variables.

In Diction, optimism is defined as, *language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive entailments*. Diction defines certainty as, *language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness*. The third proxy used in this paper for
overconfidence is self-reference which is the normalized frequency of first-person singular and plural pronouns in each narrative (I, me, my, mine, we, us, our, ours).

**Mutual Fund Performance**

Performance of mutual funds continues to baffle academics and practitioners alike. Households hold a significant proportion of their investment in mutual funds thereby elevating these vehicles to the stature of commercial banks as systemically important financial institutions. The existence of several fund families targeting different markets and offering packaged and unpackaged products complicates their performance analysis. Potential investors are therefore at a loss on how to allocate their resources among the existing funds. Various organizations have sprung up to bridge this gap by analyzing performance of these mutual funds and disseminating such material information to investor at a fee. Fund attributes such as loads, fees, advertisement, visibility, size, and age affect performance.

**Fund Flow Determinants**

Fund flows are changes in total net asset value less asset appreciation which occur whenever existing shareholders redeem their positions or when new investors buy into the fund. Researchers have categorized these flows into two; aggregate flows and individual flows (Sirri & Tufano, 1998; Elton et al. 2003). Correlating performance and fund flows presents mixed results with some researchers documenting weak correlation (Smith, 1978; Woerheide, 1982) while others document strong correlation (Ippolito, 1992). In most cases such correlation is fund type dependent (Cashman et al. 2006). Even though performance persistence occurs in some funds, capital markets experience swings in the form of bulls and bears and investors prefer buying top performing funds to low performing funds (Goriaev et al 2002; Barber et al. 2005).

**Compensation Incentives**

Traders and money managers are paid to play with other people’s money. Their job is to take risks and maximize returns within some broad guidelines regarding trading/investment objectives and risk tolerance. As their customers’ agents, fund managers are compensated with incentive contracts that reward superior results and weed out underperformers. Agency theory presents theoretical foundations for understanding impacts of compensation contracts on agent’s decisions in many settings, including money management. Specifically, implied links between compensation and risk taking are important for trading and money management. In some instances risk taking is driven more by the specific nature of incentive
contracts and less by the broad guidelines under which a trader or money manager is supposed to operate (Orphanides 1996).

1.2 Research Problem

Capital markets avenues through which most retail investors secure their financial health. Regular market swings and black swan events call into question market efficiency forcing investors to diversify their portfolios. Mutual funds come in handy with tailor made products for such investors. But despite their popularity, mutual fund performance evaluation continues to trail passively managed index funds and exchange traded funds net of costs (Sharpe, 1966; Treynor & Mazuy, 1966; Jensen, 1968; McDonald, 1974; Elton et al. 1993; Gruber, 1996; Daniel et al. 1997). It is therefore imperative to focus on fund managers’ portfolio management ability and subsist with their passively managed counterparts.

Fund managers operate in complex environments where contracts and success is determined by positive alphas. Alpha managers are compensated for risk adjusted performance while poor performers are weeded out. Manager overconfidence is therefore rewarded (Grinblatt and Titman 1989; Golec 1992; Roll 1992; Das and Sundaram 1998a, b and 2002; and Palomino and Prat 2003) in terms of asset based fees and performance based fees. A strand of literature exists on overconfidence of corporate managers and corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2008; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011; and Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). Similar studies on mutual funds would be timely and the current review comes in to bridge the gap specifically in Kenya.

Studies on mutual funds in Kenya are far and between, Iraya (2014) concentrates on ethical investment specifically how socially responsible investment relates with performance under the intervention of portfolio management and moderation of institutional characteristics. A gap exists on conventional investment. This paper seeks to correlate fund manager overconfidence with mutual fund performance under the intervention of fund flows and moderation of compensation incentives in Kenya. A guiding research question of this review is: what is the relationship among fund manager overconfidence, fund flows, compensation incentives and performance of mutual funds in Kenya. The study is therefore premised on the following specific research questions:

1. What is the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance?
2. What is the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and fund flows?
3. What is the relationship between fund flows and performance?
4. What is the effect of compensation incentives on the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance?

5. What is the effect of fund flows on the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance?

6. What is the joint effect of fund manager overconfidence, fund flows and compensation incentives on performance?

In essence, this paper seeks to determine the relationship among fund manager overconfidence, fund flows, compensation incentives and performance of mutual funds in Kenya? Specific areas of focus are (1) the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance (2) the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and fund flows (3) the relationship between fund flows and performance (4) the effect of compensation incentives on the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance (5) the effect of fund flows on the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and performance (6) the joint effect of fund manager overconfidence, fund flows and compensation incentives on performance

1.3 Value of the Study

Firstly, in terms of practical implications, this review informs potential retail investors’ choice of fund managers. Investment in capital markets is subject to market swings resulting in bear and bull conditions. This creates uncertainty to which material information comes handy. Investors are advised to expect overconfident fund managers to post optimistic annual reports with positive alphas and increased risk levels. The review therefore adds to available literature on behavioral finance by analyzing professional fund managers and their susceptibility to behavioral heuristics and their risk affinity as they play with other peoples’ money.

Secondly, this review studies the possibility of momentum strategies of actively managed mutual funds and whether such persistence is attributable to fund manager skill or luck. Fund managers are therefore examined from a behavioral point of view and a distinction or similarity with their retail clients revealed. Whether such momentum strategies have implications on fund flows or not is examined.

Thirdly, this review informs fund managers themselves as they go about their portfolio management functions. It opens up how complex their work environment is and the
ramifications of their heuristics on risk taking behavior. Higher risk affinity translates to possibility of either higher returns or higher losses.

Fourthly, the government, through regulatory agencies such as the Capital Markets Authority better understands complex work environment of fund managers and therefore design appropriate rules and regulations to better protect investors from market swings and fund manager heuristics.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Foundation

This literature review is premised on four classical finance theories; modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) on which the paper is founded on, stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984), efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A discussion of their relevance to this study is undertaken below.

Modern Portfolio Theory

This theory proposes that investors expect to be compensated for taking additional risk, and that an infinite number of "efficient" portfolios exist along a curve defined by three variables: standard deviation, correlation coefficient, and return. The efficient-frontier curve consists of portfolios with the maximum return for a given level of risk or the minimum risk for a given level of return. The algorithm used to generate the curve is known as mean variance optimization (Markowitz, 1952. MPT postulates that an investment bears two types of risk: systematic and unsystematic (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). Systematic risk is the risk inherent in the volatility of the entire capital market, while specific (unsystematic) risk is associated with the volatility of an individual security. Investors may assemble portfolios in such a way that the specific risk carried by any individual security within the portfolio is offset by the specific risk carried by another. In this regard, Sharpe (1964) holds that efficient capital markets reward investors for bearing systematic risk, but because diversification is possible, investors are not rewarded for bearing specific risk. That is, when a fund carries specific risk, it fails to reach the efficient frontier, wherein the risk/return trade-off is optimized. This theory is the foundation of this study as it shows whether fund managers are able to outperform the market or not and the importance of active management at the expense of passive management of funds.
**The Stakeholder Theory**

Stakeholder theory assumes that firms possess both explicit and implicit contractual obligations the satisfaction of which shapes their terms of trade (Freeman, 1984). In this regard, Telser (1980) observes that implicit contracts lack legal recourse and only become self-enforcing when the present value of a firm improves on its goodwill and likewise deteriorates with erosion of goodwill. Similarly, Jones (1995) agrees that firms that honour contractual obligations honour enjoy synergetic advantages such as transaction costs. When mostly retail investors are rewarded with positive alpha performance, fund managers are rewarded with increased flows thereby earning high returns. This theory helps explain why retail investors stick to their fund managers despite underperformance less of costs.

**Efficient markets Hypothesis (EMH)**

Capital markets are susceptible to swings thereby creating bull and bear conditions. The underlying factor is possession or lack of material information. Investors are advised not to panic during bear conditions and instead take contrarian stance by buying losing stock and sell winning stock. This theory postulates that markets adjust quickly to information that leaning against it becomes impossible such that an investor would rather buy into the market than try to beat it through charting or fundamental analysis (Fama, 1965). Rational investors populate the market and losses capture investors more than gains. It would be interesting comparing positive alpha fund managers against their negative alpha counterparts given that momentum strategies are rare and far between in Kenya.

**Prospect Theory**

This is a descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It assumes that market agents weigh wealth gains and losses from a specific asset and not absolutely as stipulated in. it caters for shortcomings of expected utility as postulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Investors care about changes in financial wealth (instead of levels) and are loss averse over these changes. The current study relies on prospect theory to examine the relationship between fund managers’ overconfidence and risk adjusted performance under the intervention of fund flows and moderation of compensation incentives. Retail investors in mutual funds rely on compensation incentives to tame moral hazards and drive better performance from fund managers. Similarly, performance depends on portfolio balancing under uncertainty.
3. Stock Selection and Timing ability of Mutual Fund Managers

Stakeholders in financial asset investment are concerned about performance metrics both for portfolio management purposes and as a yardstick for risk profiling. Momentum tendencies endear fund managers to stakeholders with respect to stock selection and market timing.

Market timing refers to the dynamic allocation of capital among broad classes of investments, often restricted to equities and short-term government debt. The successful market timer increases the portfolio weight on equities prior to a rise in the market, and decreases the weight on equities prior to a fall in the market. A mutual fund manager’s ability to shift a fund’s allocation is constrained to varying degrees by the investment objectives of the fund, as established in the fund’s “Statement of Additional Information.”

A manager constrained to holding equities might then time the market by adjusting the correlation between a portfolio’s return and the market return as the market rises and falls. In addition, market timing activity may be hindered by restrictions on the use of leverage and derivatives placed on mutual funds by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Company Act of 1940. Hedge fund managers are not constrained by these sorts of limits; hence we may expect more evidence of market timing and other dynamic strategies among hedge fund managers than mutual fund managers, as indicated by the results of Fung and Hsieh (1997).

Stock selection on the other hand deals with asset allocation criterion premised on market price of individual financial assets. Fund managers could employ value oriented strategies or growth oriented strategies in their stock selection undertakings. It all depends on monitoring market sentiments; price volatility and arbitraging positions adequately through portfolio rebalancing. Researchers have been keen on fund managers’ market timing and stock selection ability and have come up with two categories of models for assessing their presence. Conditional models regard material information as futuristic and positively rewarding in terms of superior returns. Researchers such as Treynor & Mazuy, (1966); Henriksson & Merton (1981) belong to this group. Unconditional models on the other hand rely on public information determining asset prices. Researchers Ferson & Schadt, (1996) exemplify this group.

Fund management literature on market timing and stock selection ability is rich and diverse. Some studies show neutrality in terms of fund manager ability (example Treynor & Mazuy, 1966; Kon 1983; Henriksson; 1984; Chang & Lewellen, 1984). Still other studies detect
only a slight influence of fund manager ability in both market timing and stock selection, (Veit & Cheney, 1982; Chen et al. 1992; Kao et al. 1998). Contrasting results are achieved by using different variable within the same context. This was the case when Chen & Jang, (1994); Bello & Janjigian (1997) in testing for positive market timing, used daily data as opposed to an earlier study by Bollen & Busse, (2001), which used monthly data. In modeling fund manager ability Becker et al. (1999) conclude that even though conditional models on market timing ability eradicate negative sign associated with unconditional models, they do not significantly reveal conditional timing ability.

Stock selection ability has also revealed contrasting results with some researchers such as Lee & Rahman, (1990); Cuthberston et al, (2008); Baker et al. (2007) report positive linkages while others such as Chang & Lewllen, (1985) report negative linkages. Still other researchers such as Volkman (1999) find a negative correlation between market timing and stock selection ability of fund managers. In as much as past performance could be futuristic, investors increase their fund inflows to best performers. As argued out by Campenhout (2007) and Capon et al. (1996), fund flow determinants are positivistic without a standard theoretical foundation. A bit of classical finance could rely on modern portfolio theory of mean variance analysis and beta factor, but behavioral aspects of heuristics and market anomalies are at the centre of funds flow determinants. Sirri and Tufano (1998) states that in a world without search cost, if consumers were prescient, they would select funds that would subsequently generate the highest risk adjusted returns. It therefore follows that maximization of expected risk adjusted returns becomes a fund selection criterion with emphasis on search costs.

### 3.1 Mutual Fund Flow Determinants

Mutual fund new flows are usually defined as change in total net asset value minus asset appreciation. Most of the empirical studies make use of normalized flows to correct for fund size effect. Some researchers consider aggregate flows (category flows) as different from individual flows (for example Sirri & Tufano, 1998; Elton et al. 2003) despite the high correlation between the two. While earlier research indicate a weak relationship between performance and flow (Smith, 1978; Woerheide, 1982), subsequent research present a robust relationship. Most studies indicate that performance-flow relationship is significantly positive (for example Ippolito, 1992) and different for different type of funds (Cashman et al. 2006). Contrary to performance persistence literature, investors direct their investments to top performing funds (Goriaev et al. 2002; Barber et al. 2005).
Several studies (Spitz, 1970; Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; Sirri & Tufano, 1998) have documented that abnormal positive returns generate disproportionately more inflows than abnormal negative returns would generate outflows. Further, because of spillover effects in mutual fund families (Nanda et al. 2003) performance flow relationship is convex in nature. This means that it is sufficient for the mutual fund family to only have some well performing funds in order to experience large inflow in its assets under management. While testing for this attribute, Harless and Peterson (1998) conducted a study on the existence of poor performing funds on 100 funds from 1977 to 1992 and conclude that investors give prominence to recent gross returns at the expense of Jensen’s alpha in determining fund flows, a fact supported by Berkowitz and Ketowitz (2000) and Cashman et al. 2006).

Similarly, Edwards and Zhang (1998) examined the relationship between aggregate mutual fund flows into stock and bond mutual funds and returns from 1961 to 1996 (30 year period in equity funds) and from 1976 to 1996 (20 year period in bond funds). By using granger causality and instrumental variables method, they conclude that higher returns cause large equity and bond fund flows. On the same line, Warther (1995) observe that flows into stock funds and bond funds were strongly correlated whereas there was a negative correlation between stock funds and money market funds. In addition there was insignificant relationship between fund flows and investor sentiment; small stock behaviour and close end fund discount behaviour.

Still other studies (Santini and Aber 1998, Warther 1995) explore the relationship between aggregate mutual fund flows and variables such as interest rate levels; risk adjusted and non-risk adjusted performance measures and changes in personal disposable income. They observe that new money flows were negatively correlated to real long term interest rates and positively related to disposable personal income and stock market performance. Investors have been found to be more sensitive to risk adjusted performance measures (Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Shu et al. 2002). Loads affect mutual fund flows differently with some researchers posting negative correlation (Cashman et al. 2006) while others post positive correlation (Berkowitz and Ketowitz, 2000). In as much as marketing efforts have positive correlation with fund flows (Sirri & Tufano, 1998; Reuter & Zitzewitz, 2006, Capon et al. 1996; Barber et al. 2005), Jain and Wu (2000) in their examination of signaling hypothesis document benchmark outperformance pre-advertisement period with underperformance post-advertisement period. Some studies such as Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) suggest that media
spotlight on mutual funds have significant economic influence on fund flows but with uncertain future prospects on performance.

Fund attributes such as age and size have an influence on fund flows with larger and older funds posting less relative flows (Barber et al. 2005). Similarly smaller younger funds attract high flows (Goriaev et al. 2002). Fund fees and loads have been found to affect performance with investors giving more weight to loads than fees (Elton et al. 2003; 2004, Barber et al. 2005, Wilcox, 2003; Nanda, 2004, Cashman et al. 2006). Marketing costs have a direct impact on fund flows as documented by Ferris & Chance, 1987; Elton et al. 2003. Managerial incentives affect risk taking behaviour thereby driving return alphas (Elton et al. 2003). Investors behave differently at purchase points with irrationality increasing with financial literacy (Capon et al. 1996; Wilcox, 2003, Goetzmann & Peles, 1997).

Diversification has also been documented to affect fund flows with investors preferring highly diversified fund families (Rockinger, 1996) whereas others prefer less diversified fund families (Siggelkow, 2003). Research on fund family size is conflicting with others suggesting negative relationship (Goriaev, 2002) whereas Rockinger (1996) suggests a positive relationship. Similarly, Nanda (2004) document spill-over effects emanating from star funds with a fund family. Brokers and financial advisors have been found to exercise substantial influence on purchase of load funds (Zhao, 2006). They direct investor monies into smaller but high load funds, which may experience better performance due to their smaller size. On the other hand, investors who have been directly investing their money, go for larger funds due to high visibility.

3.2 Compensation Incentives

Agency theory monitors moral hazard by factoring in high-incentive contracts for managers which leads to increased fund leverage (Grinblatt and Titman 1989). Conversely, Ross (2004) shows that sometimes, compensation incentives do have a negative correlation with risk appetite. Similarly, Avramov and Wermers (2006) model an investment strategy that captures manager skill, fund risk loadings and benchmark returns. Some researchers (Hendricks et al. 1993; Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994; Brown and Goetzmann 1995; Carhart 1997; and Bollen and Busse 2005) show that performance persistence in mutual funds is short term in nature. However, Carhart (1997) shows that momentum effect can explain all the observed persistence in performance of the best funds, while Wermers (2000) explains the persistence through funds’ expenses but not through managerial ability.
3.3 Mutual Fund Performance Issues

Performance evaluation has received a lot of attention from academics and practitioners alike. This has seen significant growth in models and benchmarking strategies. In one of the earliest studies on mutual fund return performance evaluation, Close (1952) compare performance of open ended and close ended funds and found that the mean returns of close ended funds are higher, in spite of three times more sales and popularity of open ended funds. Similarly, Brown and Vickers (1963) observe that different type of funds require different performance criteria. Subsequently, various performance measures have been developed, primarily taking inputs from the pioneering work on Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952; 1959) and Capital asset pricing theory also known as CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Treynor, 1965; Mossin, 1966).

In his study, Treynor (1965) discusses the impact of market on portfolio returns and risk aversion by investors by graphically developing a measure for management performance. On the other hand, Sharpe (1966) presents a linear relationship between expected return on portfolio and its associated risk premium known as beta. Performance is measured in the form of Sharpe ratios (reward to variability ratio) and that higher Sharpe ratios are preferred to lower ratios.

In as much as alphas and betas of mutual fund performance attained wide publicity, Miller and Gressis (1980) observe that the estimates of fund alphas and betas provide misleading information if non-stationarity present in the risk-return relationship is ignored. Similarly, Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) analyze both actual and gross portfolio returns and report superior performance in growth funds, aggressive growth funds and smaller funds. A large number of studies recorded negative alphas with respect to the benchmarks used (Sharpe, 1966; Treynor & Mazuy, 1966; Jensen, 1968; McDonald, 1974; Elton et al. 1993; Gruber, 1996; Daniel et al. 1997).

Some studies like that of Malkiel (1995) concluded that negative alphas were found with net returns and positive alphas were found with the gross returns, but neither alpha was found statistically significant different from zero. Trying to explain the cause of the underperformance, Wermers (2000) concluded that the under-performance of equity funds as compared to the market average was due to sub optimal performance of the non-stock holdings of the portfolio; transaction costs and expense ratios. Although there are numerous studies signifying underperformance, Kosowski et al. (2006) examine performance of US
mutual fund industry from the period 1962 to 1994 by bootstrap method and conclude that some of the managers achieved superior genuine performance.

4. Conclusion

Fund managers operate in a complex work environment where performance is measured in terms of alphas. In such environment, there is increased importance of knowledge intensive processes, flat managerial hierarchies, increased use of information technology in value creation processes and increased globalization of corporate structures. Flat managerial structures may lead to corporate preference for secrecy over private disclosure. Indeed, if higher incentives increase both performance and risk, then it is likely to be neutral for investors and can be justified most likely in terms of producer surplus for the mutual fund management families. If, however, incentives improve managerial effort, by increasing collection of information, encouraging better techniques for constructing portfolios, or improving technological infrastructure — there should be a positive relation between performance and incentives, even after controlling for risk and survival. Moreover, according to conditioning on incentives, performance should persist. The attraction of net money flows is the mainstay of mutual fund success and survival. The key element is that fee compensation is typically charged as a percentage of total assets under management. As a consequence, a profound insight in the factors shaping the mutual fund purchase and redemption decision is an indispensable strategic and marketing tool. Moreover, investors could assess their previous investment decisions, and subsequently adjust their behaviour if their investment choices exhibit systematic biases.

4.1 Knowledge Gaps Identified

Several articles exist on fund manager compensation incentives in developed economies of Europe and America (Coles et al., 2000; Deli, 2002; Deli and Varma, 2002; Kuhnen, 2004; Warner and Wu, 2004). Similarly, research on fund flows and performance has gained prominence (Spitz, 1970; Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). The current study seeks to replicate those studies in Kenya where financial architecture is less developed. Still other studies document a correlation between fund manager overconfidence, compensation incentive and performance (Malmendier et al. 2011; Hill and Phan 1991; Hayes et al., 2012; Skantz 2012). This paper is the first to document fund manager overconfidence, fund flows and compensation incentives on performance of mutual funds in Kenya. Whereas Iraya (2014) looks at socially responsible investment and performance of
mutual funds in Kenya under portfolio management as the intervening variable with institutional characteristics moderating the relationship, the current paper is the first one to look at fund manager overconfidence and performance of mutual funds in Kenya under fund flows as the intervening variable and compensation incentives moderating the relationship.

4.2 Recommendations for Further Research

In as much as the current paper concentrates on mutual funds, a look at pension funds in Kenya would be fertile ground for collective investment obligations. The current paper controls for compensation incentive as the moderating variable, a look at gender, age or experience of fund manager would reveal a lot on fund manager decision making processes.

5. References


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